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Germany in the process of unifying the country and Europe

The division of Germany

The resolutions reached by the winning powers at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences after the Second World War were a severe crackdown on the defeated Germany, the country responsible for the war. The territory of Germany decreased by 48% and the population by 38%. During the war, almost seven million Germans lost their lives and 5 million were taken captive. Over 30% of the national wealth was damaged and production fell down to 15% compared to the situation in 1939. Germany was forced to accept the 'four Ds' plan – demilitarization, democratization, denazification and decartelization², and the country was burdened with war reparations of 20 billion dollars. The post-war German territory was divided into four occupation zones: American, Soviet, British and French, and Berlin was divided into four occupation sectors.

In January 1947, Americans and the British made a decision to connect the zones occupied by them and in this way the so called Bizone was created. In April 1949 the French zone was also attached converting it into the Trizone. The blockade of Berlin by the Soviet authorities from 22 June 1948 intensified the conflict between the Western powers and the USSR³. Talks on the unity of Germany came to no avail and, as a consequence, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was proclaimed on 21 September 1949, and on 7 October the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was created. At the end of the war it might seem that the agreement between the anti-Hitler coalition countries would build unity in Europe. However, in practice it has been divided both Europe and Germany⁴.

¹ **Łukasz Jureńczyk** – doktor nauk humanistycznych w zakresie nauk o polityce, Instytut Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy.

² E. Męclewski, *Niemcy w Europie*, Warszawa 1974, s. 51-52.

³ H. Schulze, *Niemcy. Nowa historia*, (tł. K. Jachimczak), Kraków 1999, s. 175-176.

⁴ T. Kośmider, J. Ślipiec, J. Zuziak, *Dwubiegunowość Europy: NATO i Układ Warszawski*, [w:] *Europejska integracja militarna. Sojusze wojskowe XX wieku*, T. Kośmider, J. Ślipiec, J. Zuziak (red.), Warszawa 2011, s. 167.

The main concepts of West Germany policy towards Europe

Two main approaches to the issue of future German politics appeared in the post-war Germany. The main postulate of the idealistic approach was moral improvement of the society and an attempt to expunge the shameful image of the country created at the time of the Third Reich⁵. In order to reach the goal it was necessary to return to the universal humanistic ideas and standards of the international law⁶. Postulates of neutrality and of limiting foreign policy to cultural aspects, as well as federalist ideas played an important role in this approach. However, in the then existing international situation, the idealistic approach was impossible to realize and soon it was marginalized.

Unlike the idealistic approach, the realistic one clearly referred to the idea of a national state. With regard to Germany's international circumstances after the defeat, it was impossible to fulfill the classic national ideas because it would certainly raise objections of both the occupants and the majority of the public. A few basic concepts indicating ways of conducting Germany's foreign policy can be distinguished within the realistic approach.

A representative of one of them was Jakob Kaiser, an activist originating from Christian-democratic political faction. He believed that, due to its strategic location, Germany should play the role of a platform between the East and the West⁷. In order to make such a mediation possible it was necessary to find a synthesis of capitalism and socialism. In practice, such a concept turned out to be unfeasible for many reasons. Obviously, Germany was not a moral authority for other countries, and if only for this reason, nobody regarded it as a stately peacemaker or mediator. Kaiser's postulates to order the world in accordance with the spirit of peace and Christian socialism sounded strange to say the least. Besides, at that time Germany was completely incapacitated and the role of the creator of the European and world order certainly did not belong to the country. Additionally, the postulated neutrality of the state was contradictory to the interests of the winning powers⁸.

The leader of the Social Democrats, Kurt Schumacher, presented a different program. The politician strongly emphasized basing on the rules of freedom, national sovereignty, respecting human and civil rights as well as parliamentary rights. He believed that Germany should join the confederation of independent

⁵ J. Kramer, *The Politics of Memory*, New York 1996, s. 259-260.

⁶ N. Elias, *Rozważania o Niemcach. Zmaganie o władzę a habitus narodowy i jego przemiany w XIX i XX wieku*, (tł. R. Dziergwa, J. Kałużny, I. Sellmer), Poznań 1996, s. 185-199.

⁷ J.J. Węc, *CDU/CSU wobec polityki niemieckiej Republiki Federalnej Niemiec 1949-1969*, Kraków 2000, s. 44-45.

⁸ S. Sulowski, *Uwarunkowania i główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej RFN*, Warszawa 2002, s. 67.

European socialist states. However, the establishment of such a confederation was far from being realistic in the face of the Cold War. Besides, the politician's rather explicit anti-American attitude fuelled fears of Germany becoming close to the Soviet Union which in 1952 proposed peace treaty with Germany to slow down its integration with the West⁹. Many of his postulates were contradictory and mutually exclusive, what is more, utterly unrealistic because of the international situation of that time. The pro-Western approach stood in contrast to the concepts of close cooperation among European socialist and social-democratic parties, most of which were heavily dependent on the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moreover, on the one hand he supported neutrality, but on the other hand, he opted for the Western countries to employ the force policy towards the Soviet Union in order to extort some concessions in the process of restoring German unity¹⁰.

Another concept was presented by Konrad Adenauer, a politician of Christian descent who played key role in a post-war Germany¹¹. Adenauer realized the position of Germany as a bargaining counter between the United States and the Soviet Union. He believed that for Germany global relations were extremely important and so it was necessary to watch them very carefully in order to take advantage of a situation at the right moment and gain as much as possible for his own country. The politician was confident that the Bonn Republic could ensure its own security only in close cooperation with the West which would with time result in the establishment of the United States of Europe. The 'Westbildung' policy, i.e. possibly close integration with western countries, went hand in hand with his radical anticommunist views. In his estimation, the integration with the West was also exceptionally beneficial for the German public who, by adopting European values and identity, could dissociate itself from its own nation's disgraceful history. Besides, the integration created an opportunity to come out of the international isolation¹².

As the Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer seemed to speak two languages. For the sake of his own people he emphasized the gravity and importance of the nation's autonomy, and thus, its unification¹³. However, in his speeches addressed to the outside world, he propagated the necessity to strengthen the co-

⁹ W. Laquer, *Russia and Germany. A Century of Conflict*, London 1965, s. 277.

¹⁰ U. Buczyński, *Kurt Schumacher und die deutsche Frage*, Stuttgart 1973, s. 168-172.

¹¹ Zob. A. Baring, *Im Anfang war Adenauer. Die Entstehung der Kanzlerdemokratie*, München 1984.

¹² K. Gózdź, *Konrad Adenauer – chadecka koncepcja Europy*, [w:] *Fenomen Europy*, Cz.S. Bartnik (red.), Lublin 1998, s. 299.

¹³ K.D. Bracher, *Das deutsche Dilemma. Leidenswege der politischen Emancipation*, München 1971, s. 181-185.

operation with the West as the priority task. Due to such an attitude he made some enemies in his own country. He was accused that excessive involvement in the political-military structures of the West would make it impossible for the country to unite because of the Soviet Union's disfavor¹⁴. Despite all those reservations, the FRG followed the western course and became one of the main initiators of the integration processes¹⁵.

Germany in the European integration process

The implementation of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's concept was justifiable in the real position of Germany after the Second World War and its formal dependence on the western powers. On 8 April 1949 in Washington, the USA, Great Britain and France created the Allied High Commission comprising three Commissioners, and on 13 September the Occupation Statute was enforced in the country. The Constitution proclaimed on 23 May 1949 was created in accordance with the western powers' postulates. It was as late as 5 May 1954 when the Treaties of Paris came into power which lifted the Occupation Statute of the FRG and granted it formal sovereignty, but the powers retained the right to make decisions in collaboration¹⁶. For years, various consultation channels functioned between the FRG authorities and the three states. The Bonn Working Group functioned from 1955 and in 1957 the Washington Working Group was established to allow ambassadors of the winning states to present their postulates as to the lines of the German politics. Besides, allied armies were stationed in the country¹⁷.

The FRG's plans concerning the integration of Western Europe went hand in hand with the expectations of other western countries which believed that Germany's involvement in the integration processes will prevent it from returning to nationalism. The proposal put forward by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, to bring under common control the production of strategic resources, was enthusiastically received in the Western-German circles. In 1951, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux states brought into being the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which was the germ of the economic integration of the continent and, at the same time, a great success of the German politics aiming at breaking the isolation.

¹⁴ R. Kochnowski, *Stanowisko SPD wobec jedności Niemiec w latach 1945-1955*, Katowice 1991, s. 16-17.

¹⁵ M.G. Dönhoff, *Kancelerze Republiki Federalnej Niemiec jakich nie znamy*, (tł. A. Bogucki), Warszawa 1999, s. 46.

¹⁶ Y. Meny, A. Knapp, *Government and Politics in Western Europe, Britain, France, Italy, Germany*, Oxford 1998, s. 372.

¹⁷ K. Hildebrand, *German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer. The Limits of Statecraft*, London 1989, s. 235-236.

In the following months, Konrad Adenauer's government became deeply involved in the French project of establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). Among others, the plan assumed remilitarization of Germany postulated by the USA, although, it was supposed to be conducted in close cooperation with the West in order to prevent an uncontrolled growth of Bundeswehr's forces¹⁸. The treaty concerning the establishment of the EDC was ratified on 27 May 1952, however, in 1954 the French National Assembly blocked its coming into effect which was a serious blow for the Bonn diplomacy. However, the collapse of the EDC concept did not end in a deadlock of the German remilitarization postulates. The lifting of the Occupation Statute by the Paris Treaty allowed Germany to quickly integrate with western defense structures and thus, still in the same year, Germany was admitted to Western European Union (WEU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)¹⁹.

For the German diplomacy it was a priority to facilitate the economic integration of the continent. Germany's involvement and long-lasting negotiations on that matter were crowned on 25 March 1957 in Rome with signing treaties on the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) regulating economic cooperation and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) regulating the production and use of nuclear energy. The EEC was an enormous step forward towards the economic integration of the continent and it strengthened Germany's position in the European economic system. The phase of fast changes ended in the 1960's during the governments of Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Kiesinger, which were a period of certain stagnation in the integration process, caused mainly by the international situation.

A significant revival took place in the era of Willy Brandt. Owing to strong German support, the EEC was enlarged by Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark. Personally, the Chancellor became most successful in the field of Eastern politics. The initiatives of normalizing relations with the Eastern bloc, recognizing the GDR and signing treaties with Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other socialist states were a great step towards releasing tensions in Europe. Despite fierce objections from the Christian-democratic opposition, the Chancellor contributed to the start of a completely new stage of the Eastern-Western Europe relations²⁰.

The next Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, followed the politics of Brandt, however, he did not have the courage to cross the boundaries set by his predecessor. The Schmidt-Genscher government paid a lot of attention to staging a dialogue of the „middle-sized states” in order to lay the ground for the future

¹⁸ J. Krauski, *Historia Niemiec*, Warszawa 2004, s. 537-541.

¹⁹ A. Watson, *The Germans. Who are they now?*, London 1992, s. 244.

²⁰ E. Cziomer, *Determinanty i główne problemy polityki wschodniej RFN*, Warszawa 1981, s. 252.

„European peaceful order”. Both politicians gave full support to the idea of creating the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) activated on the grounds of The Helsinki Final Act of 30 July – 1 August 1975²¹.

In 1983, basing on the German-Italian „Genscher-Colombo plan”, the European Community ratified an important declaration on the European Union, outlining further directions of the integration. In the 1980’s, the FRG under the rule of Helmut Kohl’s government, was the most eager advocate of increasing the political and economic-monetary cooperation, broadening the authority of the European Parliament and reforming the decision-making mechanism within the Council of the European Union. The postulates were taken into account in the Single European Act signed in 1986.

The politics exercised by the Bonn Republic towards Europe in the whole period of its existence was marked by a powerful drive for the integration of Western Europe. Initially, the FRG became involved in the integrating processes launched by other countries, mainly France. Later on, in the course of gaining more political independence and significance on the continent, it became the main driving force behind the integration²². From mid-1960’s, the FRG also began to get deeply involved in the process of entering into cooperation with the Eastern Bloc states which had a positive influence on the process of defusing the situation in Europe.

The indicators and process of the German unification

The divided Germany was a characteristic creation of the Cold-War situation. The separation line between two opposing ideological and political-military blocs ran across its territory. The GDR found itself within the Soviet Union’s influence zone, which imposed upon it, as well as other satellite states, the socialist political system. The Federal Republic of Germany, after the Second World War, adopted pro-Western orientation and the democratic ruling system. Over a span of years, it participated actively in the integration processes of Western Europe and the Euro-Atlantic security system. The division of the continent as well as the country prevailed for over forty years.

With the passing of time, Germans’ faith in the possibility of reuniting decreased steadily. While in 1951, the survey conducted in the FRG by the Emnid-Institut showed that 10% of the polled were confident of the unification in a foreseeable time, in 1983 as few as 2% of the polled expressed such an optimism. In 1951 there were 28% of those believing that the unification would not take place in a foreseeable time, and in 1983 there were already as many as

²¹ J. Serczyk, *Podzielone Niemcy. Przegląd dziejów niemieckich od kapitulacji Trzeciej Rzeszy do zjednoczenia obu państw niemieckich*, Toruń 1996, s. 154-156.

²² S. Bulmer, Ch. Jeffery, W. Paterson, *Germany’s European Diplomacy. Shaping the Regional Milieu*, Manchester 2001, s. 9.

60%. In 1986 only 7% of the polled claimed that the unification would happen in their lifetime²³. Despite those extremely pessimistic moods, the general conviction was that it was advisable to move towards unification. In 1987 as many as 80% of the FRG population opted for the unity of the country. What is interesting is the views of the then majority of the population that the European integration was a more urgent issue than the German unification. In 1983, such an opinion was shared by 60% of the polled²⁴.

As far as the GDR citizens are concerned, it is rather difficult to find realistic and reliable data. According to a survey carried out by western institutes in 1987, 71% of the polled inhabitants of the GDR opted for the reunification of the country. As for the political system of the future country, 58% supported a third option between capitalism and socialism, and 25% were in favor of the real socialism²⁵.

There were several indicators which had influence on the fact that the unification became possible. The indicators of the evolution of the German matter can be conventionally divided into external and internal ones. As for the external ones, we can distinguish a change in the character of the East-West relations, crisis of the 'realistic socialism' system, progress of the Western-European integration and the increase in the importance of FRG on the international scene. Among the internal indicators, we can notice maintaining by FRG the option of the all-German doctrine, the crisis in GDR, intra-German relations and the attitude of Germans from both states²⁶.

As far as the East-West relations are concerned, in the late eighties they eased considerably. It was connected with the fact that in the Soviet Union reformists, led by Mikhail Gorbachev as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), rose to power. The leader of the Soviet Union enforced the concept of deideologising and demilitarizing of politics which allowed for starting talks on conventional and nuclear disarmament as well as agreements on Confidence and Security Building Measures²⁷.

²³ E. Carter, *How German is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Women*, Michigan 2000, s. 27-28.

²⁴ A. Sakson, *Zjednoczeni, lecz nadal podzieleni. Problem zjednoczenia Niemiec w świadomości społecznej Niemców*, [w:] *Zjednoczenie Niemiec. Studia politologiczno-ekonomiczno-prawne*, L. Janicki, B. Koszel, W. Wilczyński (red.), Poznań 1996, s. 50-51.

²⁵ P. Westle, *Nationale Identität im Umbruch*, „Politische Bildung” 1991, s. 68.

²⁶ E. Cziomer, *Historia Niemiec 1945-1991. Zarys problemu niemieckiego od podziału do jedności*, Kraków 1992, s. 156-161.

²⁷ M. Rimanelli, *East-West Arms Control and the Fall of the USSR 1967-1994. Radical Change or Expedient Accommodation?* „East European Quarterly” 1995, vol. 29, nr 2, s. 273-274.

A reaction to the increasingly deepening crisis in the Soviet Union and other 'realistic socialism' states was launching the 'perestroika' program, i.e. reforming the communist system which, as a consequence, led to its collapse. Due to the thaw in the Soviet Union, people in the satellite countries started to get a chance to speak by organizing mass demonstrations in support of the democratic changes. The importance of the democratic opposition grew more and more. In the GDR it was mainly 'the New Forum', in Poland – 'Solidarity', in Czechoslovakia – 'the Civic Forum' and in Hungary 'the Democratic Forum'. The transformations in Poland of 1989 within the 'round table' gave rise to bloodless revolutions in the other Eastern Bloc states.

Western-European integration in the economic field was significant in terms of the process of German unification since it stepped up the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), because the member states expressed their aspirations for future association and, in the course of time, full membership in the European Community structures. Besides, owing to close economic bonds with the FRG, the GDR was to some extent an unofficial member of the Community.

For decades, the position of Western Germany in Europe and in the world had strengthened considerably. FRG became one of the main driving forces behind European integration, and also an important element of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Despite its formal dependency on the three powers, in fact FRG realized its politics independently and it became a serious player in the global international relations.

The basic internal indicator of the integration was maintaining by FRG the all-German doctrine. Until the beginning of the seventies, in accordance with Hallstien's doctrine, FRG did not recognize GDR and it only acknowledged the German state borders established in 1937²⁸. The subsequent recognition of GDR as a country did not bring about giving up on unification aspirations which were an imperative recorded in the Federal Constitution. Also, the vast majority of the public in both German countries opted for the country's unification despite the fact that on both sides the process itself was perceived in different ways. The last of the internal indicators of the unification, i.e. the crisis in the GDR, was strictly connected with the political-economic crisis in the whole Eastern Bloc. Faced with economic collapse, citizens of the GDR were even more eager to unite with their western neighbor which impressed with its power and wealth.

In the face of the 1989 changes in Central-Eastern Europe, the most important for FRG, BDR and other countries was the attitude of Moscow towards the events taking place. On 6 June 1989 in Bonn, in a bilateral Gorbachev-Kohl

²⁸ S. Lee, *German Decision-Making Elites and European Integration. German 'Europapolitik' during the Years of the EEC and Free Trade Area Negotiations*. [w:] *Building Postwar Europe*, A. Deighton (red.), London 1995, s. 40-41.

declaration, the leader of the Soviet Union declared Moscow's support for the idea of states' autonomy, and thus, he expressed his consent for the unification of Germany. The declaration claimed that the unification was desirable for the realization of the concept of 'common European home' promoted by Gorbachev who as a key player was taken aback by the speed of political changes in Europe²⁹. At the same time, Mikhail Gorbachev appealed to Erich Honecker and the other SED leaders to ensure a peaceful transformation in GDR³⁰.

The events happened rapidly and even a few months earlier nobody had predicted that things would take such a turn. In the summer of 1989, Hungary opened its border with Austria for fugitives from GDR which made it possible for 60 thousand people to escape west only in the period between June and July. In October, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators demanding the democratization of the social-political life took to the streets of Eastern German cities. On 8 November in Bundestag, Chancellor Helmut Kohl pledged to give a considerable support to GDR on condition that its government should get rid of the constitution rule concerning the authority monopoly of the SED, allow the establishment of independent political parties and fully free elections³¹.

9 November turned out to be the breakthrough day as it was when the GDR Council of Ministers' act was proclaimed. It gave consent to unconditioned application for leaving the country and instant issuing of permits was offered. On that day, the border between East and West, impenetrable for years, was practically opened. Immediately, the wall dividing Berlin from 1961 collapsed. Since then, citizens of GDR could cross the border to travel west practically unimpeded. Another turning point was Chancellor Kohl's announcement, on 28 November, of the ten-point plan whose implementation was, in several stages, supposed to lead to the unification of the country³². Meanwhile, on 7 December, the 'round table' with the representatives of the authorities as well as the opposition parties began their session.

In February 1990 in Ottawa, Ministers of Foreign Affairs from United States, Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and both of the German countries established the 'Two plus Four' talks formula whose subject was supposed to be the internal aspects of the German unification and the issue of security of the neighboring countries. In order for the GDR to become a lawful partner of the

²⁹ P. Alter, *The German Question and Europe*, London 2000, s. 129.

³⁰ H. Teltschik, 329 dni. *Zjednoczenie Niemiec w zapiskach doradcy kanclerza*, [tł. R. Drecki, M. Struczyński], Warszawa 1992, s. 256.

³¹ M. Vogt, *Deutsche Geschichte, Von den Anfängen bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, Stuttgart 1991, s. 660-664.

³² Z. Mazur, *Plan Kohla*, „Przegląd Zachodni” 1990, nr 3, s. 77-80.

talks with the social legitimization, on 18 March 1990 a special democratic election was held there for the first time in 40 years³³.

The „Two plus Four” Treaty of 12 September 1990 on the final regulations concerning the German unification contains numerous vital resolutions on the unification of Germany. First of all, the Treaty hands full sovereignty over to Germany since the winning powers relinquish their rights and responsibilities to it. Moreover, it determines the territory of Germany as the area of FRG, GDR and Berlin and, at the same time, it forbids the neighboring countries to stake out claims to the territories³⁴. The treaty additionally bans using force in any way that is against the United Nations Charter and it also obliges Germany to reduce its army to 370 thousand soldiers and to renounce the possibility of possessing Weapon of Mass Destruction. Besides, it orders the occupant armies to withdraw from the territory of Germany³⁵. Intra-German integration processes were conducted concurrently with the „Two plus Four” negotiations. On 18 May 1990, FRG and GDR signed an agreement on the monetary, economic and social union. On 3 August, the agreement on the preparation for the all-German election for the Bundestag was signed. The election was to be fully democratic and conducted in accordance with the uniform election law. Finally, on the night of 22 and 23 August, after a heated debate, the „People’s Chamber” passed a declaration on GDR’s joining FRG. On 31 August, the Western German minister of interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, and the Eastern German secretary of state, Günter Krause, signed the final Unification Treaty by the law of which, on 3 October 1990, Germany became one country.

After the unification, FRG strengthened its position of a European power. Its potential, especially political and demographic, increased considerably. After over 40 years, citizens from both states were a unity again, and those from the East were also given freedom. However, the unification is not an easy process and even today negative consequences come in its wake. They are mainly economic problems resulting from huge expenditures allotted for curing Eastern German economy and adjusting it to western standards³⁶. Also Bundeswehr faced a task unprecedented in recent European military history. It had to figure out what to do with former members of the National People’s Army, with their

³³ A. Hoffmann (red.), *Niemcy w świetle faktów i liczb*, [tł. Ch. Schuwalski], Frankfurt am Main 1993, s. 189.

³⁴ V. Berghahn, *Modern Germany. Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge 1987, s. 257.

³⁵ W. Czapliński, *Zewnętrzne aspekty międzynarodowo-prawne zjednoczenia Niemiec. Problematyka sukcesji państw*, [w:] *Zjednoczenie Niemiec. Studia politologiczno-ekonomiczno-prawne*, L. Janicki, B. Koszel, W. Wilczyński (red.), Poznań 1996, s. 351-365.

³⁶ D.F. Patton, *Cold War Politics in Postwar Germany*, London 1999, s. 121.

formidable stocks of equipment, at the time when Germany was reducing its military as a result of agreement reached by Helmut Kohl and Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1990 on Russian preconditions for the unification of Germany³⁷. Nevertheless, the negative aspects, significant as they are, are overshadowed by the momentousness of the desired unification of the country.

The position and role of a united Germany in a united Europe

Joining in the GDR did not have a negative influence on Germans' interest in the integration process in Europe. United Germany, like the Bonn Republic, is the main driving force of the integration. Respective German governments support and successfully push through proposals which gradually but consistently hand over wider and wider range of authority to the supranational level.

In accordance with the theory of functionalism, successive governments of the united Germany see the European Union, in a slightly more remote prospect, as a form of a federal state in which the components retain relatively high level of sovereignty. Similarly to the theory of neofunctionalism, the German authorities assume that, according to the spillover effect, a successful integration in one field brings about the launch of integration in related fields. German governments look at the integration processes comprehensively, paying a lot of attention to facilitating integration both in the political-military and economic spheres as well as by seeking common elements. In case the tasks can be carried out more efficiently on the supranational rather than national level, Germany supports handing over fuller and fuller authority to the institutions on the Union level which, according to the theory of constructivism, have positive influence on the shaping of common interests of member states.

Simultaneously, Germany cares about ensuring for itself possibly big influence on the decisions taken on the supranational level. German effectiveness in pushing through their own projects results greatly from the experience and excellent negotiating skills of the German diplomacy, abilities to seek political allies and work out satisfactory compromises. In their actions, Germans base on commonly established rules of the international law. Germany also must act with sensitivity to historical experience. When the Germany erected a memorial for refugees from Central Europe, more than a decade of hard work on reconciliation with Poles was placed in doubt³⁸. Nevertheless, Germany, feeling a common responsibility of the West for so-called „black trinity”, namely Munich

³⁷ D.R. Herspring, *From the NVA to the Bundeswehr. Bringing the East Germans into NATO*, [w:] *America's New Allies. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO*, A.A. Michta (red.), Washington, Seattle, London 1999, s. 13.

³⁸ P. Seifter, *Culture and capabilities of the new EU members*, [w:] *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. Project, principles, practicalities*, M. Glasius, M. Kaldor (red.), New York 2006, s. 218.

Pact, Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and the Yalta Agreement lobbied for the inclusion of countries from Central and Eastern Europe to Western integration structures³⁹.

In connection to the collapse of communism in Central-Eastern Europe, the role of Germany in the field of security has changed fundamentally. Eastern Germany and Western Germany are no longer means of a political game between rival political blocs. United Germany have adopted fully pro-Western and pro-integration course remaining, in that respect, the follower of the Bonn Republic. It has also remained faithful to the protection of fundamental values, like freedom, security, peace or commitment to law. However, the forms of Germany's activity in terms of the security policy have been modified remarkably, mainly due to changed expectations of the remaining parties of the international relations about the role that united Germany should play in the European, as well as world security system. Mostly United States expected that Europe and Germany will assume greater responsibility for global security problems⁴⁰. Germany, however, do not fully meet those expectations. As evidence, in 2005 they spent on the army just 1.4 percent of GDP, and in 2009 just 1.2 percent of GDP⁴¹.

Analysing in detail the actions of united Germany it can be noticed that it looks for the most proper forms of behaviour that suit also the other participants in the international relations, which has theoretical grounds in constructivism. Along the German unification some external expectations aroused that Germany would assume more responsibility for the European and world security. In view of such a situation, Germany came to the conclusion that its role had to change and with regard to that, among others, the military activity of German troops in various areas of the world increased considerably. Missions with Bundeswehr's participation are peace-restoring and peace-keeping in character, and simultaneously with the military actions diplomatic measures are always taken.

Respective German governments bow to the pressures not only from the external actors but also from their own society. As a consequence, decisions concerning participation in specific military actions must also gain support from the home public opinion. Decision-makers' vulnerability to both external and internal pressures results in the fact that more precise courses of actions are not clearly defined and undergo changes along with the changing international

³⁹ A. Lašas, *European Union and NATO Expansion. Central and Eastern Europe*, New York 2010, s. 141.

⁴⁰ C. Kelleher, *The European Security Strategy and the United States: the past as prologue*, [w:] *The EU and the European Security Strategy*, S. Biscop, J.J. Andersson (red.), New York 2008, s. 148-149.

⁴¹ A. Zięba, *Cywilna kontrola nad armią w Republice Federalnej Niemiec*, [w:] *Międzynarodowe wyzwania bezpieczeństwa*, K. Budzowski (red.), Kraków 2010, s. 212.

situation. Due to that, the German security policy is developed in the normal course.

After reunification and the enlargement of NATO to the East Germans felt secure and focused on the unification of Europe. At present, some European partners expect Germany to play a kind of leading role in the strengthening of the European security component and, in this way, gaining more independence of the United States. With regard to that, Germany is taking more independent decisions and tries to convince its partners to follow. At the same time Germany should both strengthen the European Union militarily and effectively seek recognition of its subjectivity in this regard by the United States⁴². Besides, German diplomacy is the main driving force encouraging closer political and military cooperation within the European Union and giving it supranational character.

In order for Germany to play a key role in the European security system and effectively fulfil the international commitments in this field, quick and thorough reforms are necessary. Currently, the expenditures on the German army, similarly to those of allied European armies, are insufficient which makes the technological gap between USA and Europe grow constantly. In order for Europe to become an equal partner of USA it is necessary to carry out organizational and technical reforms which Germany should spark off as the mightiest European power. Germany, trying to show independence from the United States, as during the conflict in Iraq, firstly should authenticate it with the capacities⁴³.

German unification also had significant influence on the economy. The adjustment process of the post-communist GDR economy to market conditions and gigantic money transfers from the West devoted to the cause shook badly the stability of the German economic situation. Several negative phenomena occurred in Germany, like the decrease in the economic growth rate, rise in unemployment or a dangerous increase in the public debt. In order to prevent further deepening of the crisis it was necessary to launch a far-fetched reform programme which, among others, aim at limiting the benefits of the welfare state. Clear symptoms of revival noticeable in the German economy after 2002 were suppressed in 2008 by the global economic crisis. Currently the German economy is gradually trying to recover from the crisis.

Regardless of temporary problems, the strength of the German economy still makes a great impression. Germany can boast the second highest in the world level of export, the fourth highest world level of the GDP as well as

⁴² J. Mondry, *Powrót geopolityki. Ameryka, Europa i Azja w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2010, s. 72-74.

⁴³ P. Buras, K. Longhurst, *The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the use of force*, [w:] *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*, K. Longhurst, M. Zaboriowski (red.), London, New York 2005, s. 58-59.

highly developed and technologically advanced industry and services. The strength and potential of the German economy are incomparably the greatest among the Union states and, undoubtedly, the position of the European economy in the world depends heavily on the position of the German economy.

Germany is the driving force of integration also in the economic sphere. Following the functionalist spillover rule, German diplomacy supports closer integration in particular fields of economy. Among others, Germany owes its strong position at the negotiation table over the shaping of the European economic system to the position of its own economy. German diplomats are successful in pushing through their own projects and influencing the decision-making process. Germans are interested in tightening cooperation within the European Union because, as the biggest exporter, they reap substantial profit of the increased cooperation. However, tightened cooperation entails the Union's serious financial strains that Germany as a net payer, has to cope with. It is also possible that the German economic dominance and export surplus has contributed to the deepening of the crisis in some EU countries

United Germany is undoubtedly the main player on the European Union's scene. Its economic and demographic potentials, and to a certain extent also the military one, speak for its strong position. Both, the decision-makers and the society support most of the initiatives aimed at tightening cooperation and strengthening the European Union. In order for the German vision of Europe to gain support from other societies, it must prove that it acts not only in its own, but mainly in the whole Europe's best interest. Currently, Germany is the leading country in helping refugees from Asia and Africa. Depending on how Germany and the entire European Union will cope with the crisis of immigration depends on the position of both Germany and the EU.

Germany in the process of unifying the country and Europe	
Streszczenie	Abstract
Niemcy Zachodnie odegrały ważną rolę w jednoczeniu Europy Zachodniej. Kraj był istotną siłą napędową zarówno gospodarczej, jak i politycznej integracji. Od lat 70. Republika Federalna Niemiec zaczęła się również otwierać na Środkową i Wschodnią Europę. Globalne i regionalne zmiany umożliwiły Niemcom zjednoczenie kraju i umocnienie pozycji jako mocarstwo europejskie i lider procesów integracji europejskiej. Nie mniej jednak wymagało to znacznej determinacji i przejmowania większej odpowiedzialności.	West Germany played an important role in the unification of Western Europe. The country has been a significant driving force for both economic and political integration. Since the 70s, Federal Republic of Germany also started to open up to Central and Eastern Europe. Global and regional changes have allowed the Germans to unite the country and strengthen its position as a European power and a leader in the European integration processes. However, this requires considerable determination and taking over more and more responsibility.
Słowa kluczowe	Key words
Niemcy, Unia Europejska, integracja europejska, zjednoczenie Niemiec	Germany, European Union, European integration, German reunification

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